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Abstract
Despite the popularity of structural neuroimaging techniques in twenty-first-century research, its results have had
limited translational impact in real-world settings, where inferences need to be made at the individual level. Structural
neuroimaging methods are now introduced frequently to aid in assessing defendants for insanity in criminal forensic
evaluations, with the aim of providing “convergence” of evidence on the mens rea of the defendant. This approach
may provide pivotal support for judges’ decisions. Although neuroimaging aims to reduce uncertainty and
controversies in legal settings and to increase the objectivity of criminal rulings, the application of structural
neuroimaging in forensic settings is hampered by cognitive biases in the evaluation of evidence that lead to
misinterpretation of the imaging results. It is thus increasingly important to have clear guidelines on the correct ways
to apply and interpret neuroimaging evidence. In the current paper, we review the literature concerning structural
neuroimaging in court settings with the aim of identifying rules for its correct application and interpretation. These
rules, which aim to decrease the risk of biases, focus on the importance of (i) descriptive diagnoses, (ii) anatomo-
clinical correlation, (iii) brain plasticity and (iv) avoiding logical fallacies, such as reverse inference. In addition, through
the analysis of real forensic cases, we describe errors frequently observed due to incorrect interpretations of imaging.
Clear guidelines for both the correct circumstances for introducing neuroimaging and its eventual interpretation are
defined
Introduction
Despite the popularity of structural neuroimaging
techniques in twenty-first-century research, its results
have had limited translational impact in real-world set-
tings, where inferences need to be made at the individual
level. Recently, however, a growing number of research
groups have attempted to overcome this issue by studying
the feasibility of single-case analysis1–6.
Structural neuroimaging (sNI) evidence is increasingly
being used in criminal trials7–9. The literature on sNI and
law tends to consider neuroscientific knowledge extre-
mely relevant for assisting in psychiatric assessments of
criminal responsibility10–12. In the penal field, holding a
defendant criminally responsible requires proof that he/
she committed the act (actus reus) and that the act was
intentional, i.e., the defendant committed the act of his/
her own free will (mens rea or guilty mind)13. Crucially,
the mens rea can be abolished (or weakened) due to the
impact of a medical condition on brain functioning10,
usually a neurologic or psychiatric condition (or, more
rarely, organic conditions, such as hypoglycemia14). In
these cases, the defendant could be considered mentally
insane at the moment of the crime and, consequently, not
responsible or having diminished responsibility for his/
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her actions. Thus, the determination of criminal respon-
sibility rests on the evaluation of the mental state of the
defendant at the time of the crime15.
Critically, a wide body of recent literature has revealed
that forensic insanity assessment is particularly prone to
different biases16,17. Most relevant is the so-called “cog-
nitive bias”, arising from the subjective humanness that
influences every step of the forensic psychological
assessment18,19, from data collection to judicial decisions.
These biases arise as forensic experts are human beings
with personal knowledge, beliefs, expectations, cognitive
schemas, etc. All of these factors influence the way for-
ensic elements are addressed and unconsciously impact
the collection, analysis, interpretation and reporting of
data18,20,21. The hierarchy of expert performance22 (HEP)
has recently been proposed to better understand expert
performance in forensic science and the biases that might
arise at each step of forensic work. The HEP has also been
applied to forensic psychology and psychiatry23, and some
bias-mitigating strategies have been proposed20. The HEP
makes a clear distinction between observations and con-
clusions, where observations pertain to data observation,
collection and analysis, while conclusions depend on the
assessment and interpretation of observations22,23.
Forensic psychologists and psychiatrists are increasingly
aware of biases that may influence expert perfor-
mances17,21. Three critical issues hampering the cred-
ibility of forensic experts are as follows: the tendency of
experts to be biased by previous expectations24, the low
inter-rater agreement in conclusions on insanity based on
clinical assessments25–28 and the variability in the rates of
evaluation outcomes as a function of the evaluator17,28,29.
For these reasons, brain images are now increasingly
introduced to assist in the assessment of insanity in
criminal cases, with the aim of providing a “convergence”
of evidence (including anamnestic, clinical and neu-
roscientific information). This is of critical relevance, as
the mens rea of the defendant is pivotal to the judge’s
decision30,31. The idea is that sNI would provide addi-
tional biological data that, when considered in conjunc-
tion with classical neurologic, psychiatric and
neuropsychologic assessments, would inform the court
about the defendant’s responsibility11. The literature
suggests that sNI evidence should not be used alone and
cannot be used solely to explain the cause of a violent
crime (e.g., “she killed her mother because she has a
frontal lobe lesion”). Rather, sNI findings (i.e., the frontal
lobe lesion) should be considered a “hard” correlate of
mental disease, symptoms of which (e.g., disinhibition) are
causally linked to the crime (e.g., the homicide)11. Thus,
the criteria for responsibility are currently behavioural
and should remain that way11,12.
Although the use of sNI in court seems to be a pro-
mising advance in reducing the uncertainty of forensic
experts’ evaluations32, their use is not free from potential
risks and biases11,12,33,34. One such bias is that neuroi-
maging results are considered to be objective, which is not
always true. In some cases, MRI data need to be analysed
with sophisticated techniques35,36, and the results can be
influenced by different technical choices. This bias con-
cerns the HEP observation level and will not be explored
in the current paper. Another worrying concern, at the
HEP conclusion level, is the potential problem of the
“inferential distance”37,38, i.e., the vivid and appealing
visual nature of neuroimaging that could make jurors
think that the images corresponded to objective findings.
Interestingly, McCabe and Castel (2008)39 examined
whether brain images affect people’s judgements of sci-
entific credibility. They found that when neuroimages
accompanied scientific summaries, the summaries were
rated as more scientifically credible than summaries pre-
sented alone or paired with graphs. Similar results were
obtained by Weisberg et al. (2008)40, who demonstrated
that jurors become more likely to be convinced by logi-
cally irrelevant explanations for behaviours if these
explanations are simply expressed in terms of neu-
roscientific evidence. Although these results do not
appear to be replicated in a real forensic setting41, they
provocatively underline the seductive charm of neuroi-
maging. This is a clear example of the biasing influence of
human involvement on judicial decisions18: if sNI evi-
dence is not properly weighed and integrated with other
evidence, it is not helpful to the forensic process. This can
lead to a potential improper use of sNI in court42, where
the risk is that consultants are more interested in gen-
erating fascinating images of the brain than they are in
elucidating their importance for explaining the behaviours
that are legally relevant33.
For this reason, it is important that neuroscientists
understand how to correctly interpret sNI evidence in the
process of evaluating insanity33,34. Furthermore, it is
important for judges and jurors to have sufficient
knowledge of the ways in which sNI evidence can be
relevant to legal questions and to recognize when it is not.
Thus, the aim of the current paper is to present practical
guidelines to be used in the delicate process of sNI result
interpretation by the following (HEP level of conclusions):
(i) forensic neuroscientists, when using neuroimaging as
scientific evidence in support of mental incompetence; (ii)
judges and jurors, during the sophisticated decision-
making process of determining the role of neuroimaging
data in support of the criminal liability of defendants.
Using the HEP terminology22,23, the guidelines aim to
enhance intra-rater and inter-rater reliability and mini-
mize bias in conclusions.
Before discussing guidelines, we will introduce relevant
concepts via two real-life forensic cases in which neu-
roscientific evidence was used to support a clinical
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diagnosis. They were selected mainly due to their simi-
larities: both homicide cases, both likely due to disin-
hibition, and both with defendants manifesting frontal
lobe dysfunction. However, there is one important dif-
ference between these cases. In the first, an objective brain
lesion was evident, while in the second, there was a subtle
alteration in grey matter volume. Thus, in the first case,
the forensic discussion focused on the causal link between
the brain lesion and the homicide (HEP level of conclu-
sions), while in the second case, the discussion focused
both on the investigation of brain abnormalities (HEP
level of observations, which will not be discussed in detail)
and on the anatomo-clinical correlation between the brain
abnormalities and behavioural dysfunction (HEP level of
conclusions).
As additional premises, we would like to underline that
(i) this paper is focused on the use of structural images
only. The introduction of functional images is further
complicated by high between-subject variability in the
blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signal, the
ecological validity of task performance43 and the absence
of false-positive distribution maps that can guide result
interpretation (this map is available for sNI4,5). Thus, the
potential application of functional imaging is a topic that
falls outside the aims of the current paper. (ii) In this
paper, we have purposely decided to present neuroima-
ging findings in an accessible and charming way in an
attempt to give the readers an idea of their charming
impact.
Examples of Real Forensic Application
Case 1
The facts
The defendant was a 40-plus-year-old man charged
with murder. In 2014, the man saw a jogger on the street
and suddenly stopped and assaulted the woman, who
reacted. After having beaten the woman severely, he
threw the body off a cliff. The next day, he went back to
the scene of the crime and masturbated on the corpse.
After ∼3 months, he was interrogated by the police and
immediately confessed the murder.
The descriptive diagnosis
The defendant was a 40-plus-year-old man who grew up
in a rural mountain area. His parents divorced when he
was nine. He had completed 5 years of education. He was
married and had a son. A few years into the marriage, he
suffered from severe head trauma due to a car accident
and was hospitalized for 3 months. His marriage lasted <2
years after his accident, and no relationship with the son
was maintained. He was unable to keep a job for more
than a few months since the accident. Moreover, he
developed a serial pattern of criminal sexual behaviour.
He was previously jailed for 1 year due to performing
frottage and making vituperative comments to women on
the street.
At the forensic psychiatric examination, no psychotic
symptoms were evident, but the defendant did appear
fatuous and avoidant. He seemed to not realize the
severity or legal consequences of his behaviour. The
neuropsychological examination revealed a borderline IQ,
impaired verbal comprehension, and below-average
working memory function. The defendant presented
with severe frontal executive functioning deficits, in par-
ticular in the ability to inhibit automatic answers (as
measured using the Stroop test44) and behaviours (as
measured using the frontal assessment battery45). During
the neuropsychological evaluation, his behaviour was
oppositional; he was easily frustrated with negative feed-
back and had a tendency to become irritated and verbally
aggressive towards the examiner.
The brain diagnosis
The CT scan (MRI could not be acquired due to the
defendant’s pacemaker) showed a brain lesion, which was
likely a result of the head trauma that had occurred 10
years prior. The lesion was detected bilaterally in the
mesial prefrontal cortex, measuring 12.29 cm3 (Fig. 1).
Interpretation of the results
According to the judge’s expert, the neuroimaging data
in this criminal case were fundamental in explaining the
constellation of symptoms that characterized the defen-
dant’s history, as well as the crimino-dynamics that led to
the homicide. From the defendant’s anamnesis, it is evi-
dent that he had undergone a “behavioural fracture” from
being a man with a normal life, marriage, and job to
exhibiting sexually depraved/disinhibited behaviour and
an inability to maintain normal relationships or jobs.
Moreover, his sexual behaviour was carried out in a
Fig. 1 3D reconstruction of the defendant’s exact brain lesion.
Based on the CT scan, the brain lesion was manually traced by one of
the authors (CS) on the MRIcro template. The traced lesion was then
overlaid to the 3D render provided by MRIcroGL software (http://
www.cabiatl.com/mricrogl/)
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disorganized and risky manner. The man used to perform
frottage on women in broad daylight, and in the case of
the murder, the aggression occurred near a main road
with a high probability of being seen.
Critically, the defendant manifested additional beha-
vioural symptoms that were a strong indication of an
affected ability to understand and to will. According to the
Italian penal code, these two capabilities are the legal basis
of the insanity plea. Regarding the defendant’s ability to
understand, he seemed not to realize the legal con-
sequences of his actions; he did not understand the risk of
being caught (supported by his return to the scene of the
crime), and he manifested a deficit in moral reasoning.
Regarding the defendant’s ability to will, his personal
history clearly revealed previous aggressions towards
women, previous outbreaks of violence, and repeated
inability to inhibit sexual urges. All these symptoms
strongly indicated pathology of the prefrontal cortex. Even
more interestingly, he manifested symptoms that were
legally irrelevant per se but strongly support frontal lobe
dysfunction through the “convergence of evidence” prin-
ciple. For instance, he was unable to inhibit non-sexual
impulses, as emerged from the neuropsychological
examination and from his verbally aggressive behaviour
during said evaluations.
The presence of the brain lesion is also important from
the crimino-dynamic prospective: after the traumatic
brain injury, the defendant manifested sexually deviant
behaviours mainly characterized by frotteurism. Sexual
alterations after traumatic brain injury are well known in
the literature46,47. Thus, there is a strong cause for caus-
ality between the brain lesion and the alteration in sexual
behaviour. However, this is not sufficient to explain the
murder. The defendant’s violent behaviour may be
explained by his easy frustration in response to negative
feedback (the woman’s refusal). This frustration was fol-
lowed by aggressive and disinhibited behaviour (the
strike), which found its equivalent in verbal aggression
towards the examiner during the neuropsychological
examination. Again, disinhibition is strongly suggestive of
frontal lobe dysfunction48–50. Notably, the defendant’s
manifest insensitivity to the consequences of behaviour
corroborated the idea of frontal lobe deficits51. Thus, a
strong anatomo-clinical correlation between the brain
lesions and pathological symptoms of the defendant is
evident.
In summary, in this case, the judge’s expert concluded
that the constellation of symptoms, legally relevant or not,
could be explained by the presence and location of the
traumatic brain lesion. The criteria for mental insanity are
grounded in the defendant’s behaviour, and neuroimaging
findings provide a useful explanation for them. The judge
concluded that the defendant should thus be considered
not responsible for his behaviour.
What if I get it wrong?
Gianfranco Stevanin was an Italian serial killer43. He
suffocated six prostitutes during extreme sexual activities
and then dismembered and buried their bodies. The man
had suffered a severe head injury resulting in a bilateral
lesion of the frontal lobes (no images are available). From
the time of the brain injury, he manifested asphyxiophilic
tendencies52. Because the frontal lobes are the brain
regions responsible for impulse control and inhibition, the
man was initially declared not responsible for the mur-
ders. According to the defence thesis, as a result of the
bilateral frontal lobe lesion, the man was unable to inhibit
sexual activity once it began. Corroborating this hypoth-
esis, the neuropsychological evaluation revealed the pre-
sence of many symptoms that clearly indicate frontal lobe
dysfunction: disadvantageous decision-making, impaired
impulse inhibition and easy irritability. In contrast, his
behaviour after the murders, e.g., the dismemberment and
concealment of the dead bodies, could not be explained by
a deficit in impulse inhibition. Critically, it was then dis-
covered that Gianfranco Stevanin used to practise the very
same extreme sexual activities with his fiancée, without
killing her. These actions provided unequivocal evidence
discrediting the claim that the man could not interrupt his
sexual impulses. In this case, the presence of the brain
injury could not be used to mitigate the man’s responsi-
bility for his crimes. Gianfranco Stevanin’s case is of
outstanding importance to exemplify that, even in the
presence of a clear brain lesion, the interpretation of its
impact on behaviour is “somewhat subjective” (human
element18) and that clinicians should consider all clinical
and behavioural information to correctly interpret the
meaning of the imaging findings.
Case 2
The facts
The defendant was a 24-year-old woman, JF, who was
charged with murder for smothering her newborn child to
death immediately after delivery31. She then wrapped the
infant’s body in a towel and hid it inside a suitcase. The
defendant later claimed that the newborn child was ‘born
dead’ due to drug abstinence syndrome (see below).
The descriptive diagnosis
Anamnestic information revealed that the defendant
started to heavily smoke cigarettes at the age of eleven.
She had a well-documented history of multidrug abuse, as
well as alcohol abuse, since the age of thirteen. She had
become pregnant during a party and did not interrupt her
drug use during pregnancy.
The forensic psychiatric examination revealed that the
defendant had a personality profile characterized by
antisocial features such as a history of illegal behaviour,
sensation seeking, familial conflict, lack of sensitivity,
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rejection of conventional standards, poor response to
threatening situations and a willingness to forgo careful
consideration of alternative solutions to problems. The
neuropsychological evaluation revealed impulsivity, i.e.,
inability to inhibit the prepotent response (as measured by
means of the Hayling test53); a deficit in planning (as
measured by means of the Tower of London54); and
deficits in emotional attribution and in identifying viola-
tions of social norms (as measured by the emotion attri-
bution task55 and social situation task56).
The brain diagnosis
The structural MRI of the defendant was compared
with the MRI of healthy women using voxel-based mor-
phometry (VBM), a neuroimaging technique that high-
lights subtle structural anatomical abnormalities35,36. The
analysis revealed a reduced grey matter volume in the left
prefrontal cortex in JF relative to the control group31 (Fig.
2).
Interpretation of the results
According to the defence consultant, the sNI data in
this case were fundamental in explaining the constellation
of symptoms that characterized the defendant’s history.
Indeed, the site of the brain alteration (i.e., the frontal
lobe) has a strong anatomo-clinical correlation with the
descriptive diagnosis, which can be summarized as frontal
syndrome, as the defendant manifested symptoms
ascribable to frontal lobe dysfunction, particularly
impulsivity57, a deficit in planning, a deficit in automatic
response inhibition58,59 and difficulty in emotional attri-
bution60, as well as alteration of the personality char-
acterized by high scores on the borderline61, depression62
and substance abuse63 subscales. Furthermore, according
to the false-positive distribution map3, the decrease in
grey matter in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)
in a single individual compared to the control group has
only a 0.5–5% probability of being a false positive.
The presence of the brain alteration in the frontal lobe is
also important from the crimino-dynamic prospective: the
symptoms identified in JF showed that she had a reduced
capacity to control her behaviour. This was extremely
relevant for the evaluation of the prosecutor’s hypothesis,
according to which JF impulsively smothered the newborn
to death. Thus, the clinically identified pathological fea-
tures are causally linked to the crime, providing the basis
for an insanity defence31. JF’s behavioural reports,
accompanied by reduced grey matter in the frontal lobe,
provided “hard” biological evidence for the defence’s case.
In summary, the defence consultants concluded that the
constellation of behavioural and neuropsychological
symptoms manifested by JF were in strong anatomo-
clinical correlation with the brain abnormalities and were
causally linked to the crime. According to the defence
consultants, JF should be considered not responsible for
her behaviour because she was unable to inhibit her
impulses.
What if I get it wrong?
A woman was charged with murder for running over a
man with her car. She underwent psychiatric and psy-
chological evaluations to understand her state of mind at
the moment of the homicide. The descriptive diagnosis
gave a negative result. The defendant’s brain MRI, ana-
lysed using VBM methodology, revealed an increase in
grey matter in the DLPFC, particularly in the middle
frontal gyrus (Fig. 3, left panel). In the absence of any
descriptive diagnosis, this result can be interpreted only
according to the literature. Since an increase in DLPFC
grey matter has been linked to binge drinking64 (Fig. 3,
right panel), it would be tempting to infer that the
defendant was a binge drinker and that the accident
occurred because she was drunk.
This conclusion and reasoning are invalid, since infer-
ring the presence of altered mental states (being a binge
Fig. 2 3D reconstruction of the localization of JF’s brain
deficiency in grey matter volume. In the image, the exact extent of
JF’s abnormality is not represented, but only the location. In the
reference paper31, the grey matter loss is reported to be localized in
the middle frontal gyrus. For this image, a binary mask on the whole
middle frontal gyrus was created using PickAtlas (http://fmri.wfubmc.
edu/software/pickatlas) and was then overlaid onto the 3D render
provided by MRIcroGL software (http://www.cabiatl.com/mricrogl/)
Fig. 3 VBM results. Reprinted from ref. 4. Left panel: VBM result of the
defendant’s brain. Right panel: VBM results in binge drinking; image
adapted from ref. 64
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drinker) from the presence of a brain alteration (increased
grey matter in the DLPFC) is a logical fallacy called
reverse inference65. This fallacy is particularly relevant in
neuroimaging studies, where behaviours are subserved by
complex brain networks and each brain region is conse-
quently involved in more than one behaviour66. Further-
more, according to the false-positive distribution map6, an
increase in grey matter in the DLPFC in a single individual
compared to the control group has up to a 23% chance of
being a false positive. Thus, this result, which has no
clinical correlate (i.e., is not in anatomo-clinical correla-
tion with the descriptive diagnosis), is likely to be a false
positive result, probably reflecting normal variability in
neuroanatomy rather than any brain pathology6. Indeed,
this case was fictional, and the VBM results reported
highlighted the grey matter increase in the brain of one of
the authors (CS) compared to a control group.
Discussion
In the current paper, we aim to provide clear guidelines
for the correct use of sNI in court. Our opinion is that sNI
should support behavioural findings to reduce con-
troversies in court. Both of the described cases clearly
demonstrate the importance of using neuroimaging
findings strictly in conjunction with behavioural evidence.
Based on the danger of incorrectly claiming the presence
or absence of a causal relationship between neuroimaging
findings and behaviour, we believe that careful beha-
vioural assessment remains more reliable than neuroi-
maging in ascertaining the relevant mental states that
form the basis of legal criteria.
While it is certainly true that neuroimaging is a pow-
erful tool whose potential for misuse can potentially cause
deleterious effects in a legal setting67, we believe it is a
mistake to deny its potential helpful applications a
priori12,68. Although neuroscientists often commit logical
errors when presenting isolated neuroscientific find-
ings33,67, we believe a similar logical error is committed by
ignoring neuroscientific data69. It is our opinion that the
legal and scientific communities should work together to
create guidelines that ensure the correct application of
neuroscientific techniques and the appropriate inter-
pretation of neuroscientific findings. In the following
paragraphs, we will discuss general rules for the use of
neuroimaging. The correct application of these rules is
extremely important to allow group-to-individual infer-
ence, a problem that neuroscientists recognize and are
trying to solve2–6,67. Finally, we will propose guidelines
that might be useful to neuroscientists, lawyers, judges
and jurors. These rules and guidelines will help to
increase within- and between-expert reliability and to
reduce within- and between-expert bias in expert testi-
mony conclusions22,23.
On the role of neuroimaging in court
Rule number 1. Neuroimaging results should be coupled
with behavioural findings. Neuroimaging results assume a
meaning only when coupled with a clear descriptive
diagnosis, i.e., with clear symptoms manifested by the
defendant. Indeed, without a clear descriptive diagnosis,
the neuroimaging findings cannot be interpreted, as
described in the paragraph “What if I get it wrong?” of
case 2. This rule has been violated in numerous cases
reported in the literature. One example is the famous case
of Weinstein, where the defence attorney used the neu-
roimaging findings of a subarachnoid cyst in the frontal
lobe to support the insanity of the defendant67,70.
Although the presence of arachnoid cysts has been asso-
ciated with atypical psychosis71, no one tested for the
presence of psychosis in the defendant or his inhibitory
abilities, moral reasoning, etc. We recognize that this rule
may open the door to biased neuroimaging results
because there is a motive to couple them with behavioural
findings. Although this is true, this potential bias lies at
the observation level of HEP and can be overcome by
blinding the experts to the descriptive diagnosis of the
defendant20,72. Rule number 1 applies mainly to wider
forensic reasoning (HEP conclusions), when the attorneys
need to integrate evidence.
Rule number 2. The criminal behaviour cannot be con-
sidered a symptom. Anatomo-clinical correlation can be
assessed between a brain region and cognitive function
but cannot be assessed between a brain region and
criminal behaviour, as there is no specific brain region
involved in complex behaviours such as criminality or
violence. Despite investigation of this topic in recent
studies73, evidence suggests that complex behaviours are
supported by highly complex brain networks73,74. Com-
plex behaviours can be broken down into contributing
cognitive functions, i.e., an irresistible impulse murder
may be partially explained by a deficit in impulse control.
Thus, the hypothetical brain abnormality must be put in
anatomo-clinical correlation with the lack of impulse
control, which should be demonstrated clinically (rule
number 1) and, if possible, by evidence beyond the
criminal act. For example, we recently studied a case of
acquired paedophilia12,68 and claimed that the defendant
was unable to inhibit his impulses. To support this
hypothesis, we referred to the man’s recently emerged
kleptomania, a fact that is irrelevant to paedophilia but
relevant to impulse control. Rule number 2 was violated
in the case of Weinstein, as the defence attorney argued
the anatomo-clinical correlation between the cyst in the
frontal lobe and the violent murder, using the violent
murder as a symptom of the cyst67,70. This rule would
help to minimize the adversarial allegiance bias17,23, which
refers to the tendency of experts to reach conclusions
supporting the side that retained them.
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Rule number 3. Not every brain abnormality leads to
behavioural symptoms. The correlation between brain
function and criminal behaviour is far from perfect.
Although violent behaviour is more likely in patients with
frontal lobe deficits than in patients with (for example)
parietal or occipital deficits, not every patient with frontal
lobe damage manifests violent behaviour. In addition to
the famous case of Phineas Gage, the poet Guillaume
Apollinaire should be considered. After being wounded in
the right temporal lobe during World War I, Apollinaire
became unaffectionate and indifferent to his girlfriend, his
personality became defiant and nostalgic, and his work
became darker—but he never manifested aggressive
behaviour75. Indeed, the brain is incredibly plastic, and
different clinical conditions demonstrate that even large
brain lesions may not lead to important behavioural def-
icits. An example is Rasmussen encephalopathy, a rare
inflammatory brain disorder leading to the death of one
hemisphere76. To date, the only known effective treat-
ment is a hemispherectomy. The literature reveals that if a
hemispherectomy is performed during childhood, patients
may not have severe neurologic sequelae76. Rule number
3 has been violated in the case of Gianfranco Stevanin, as
the defence attorney wrongly ascribed his violent beha-
viour to the frontal lobe deficit. This rule would help in
minimizing confirmation bias20, which describes the
tendency of experts to reach conclusions that confirm
what they already believe to be true.
Rule number 4. Do not reason backwards. To infer the
presence of an altered mental state from the presence of
brain pathology is a reverse inference. Reverse inferences
are a logical fallacy that should be avoided16,65. The cor-
rect neuroscientific reasoning is the following: the
defendant behaviourally manifested difficulties in beha-
vioural control; the defendant also has a brain lesion in
the frontal lobe; thus, the brain lesion might account for
the lack of behavioural control. Assuming the presence of
a psychiatric or neurological disorder from brain images is
dangerous both from the clinical (i.e., wrong drug treat-
ment) and forensic (i.e., incorrect conclusion on insanity)
points of view. Rule number 4 was violated in both
Weinstein’s case and the case described in the “What if I
get it wrong?” paragraph of case 2. As with rule 1, rule 4
can be applied to both the observation and conclusion
levels of HEP. One way to mitigate the bias of backwards
reasoning at the HEP level of observation is to avoid
providing neuroimaging experts with irrelevant case
information, which might cause cognitive contamina-
tion20. One way to mitigate the risk of bias at the HEP
level of conclusions is to request neuroimaging
Fig. 4 Flow chart summarizing the guidelines for the correct use of neuroimaging in a forensic setting
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investigation only when the defendant presents with clear
psychiatric or cognitive symptoms, as explained in the
following guidelines.
Practical guidelines to avoid misinterpretation of results
In the current paragraph, we will operationalize the
rules in practical guidelines for the correct use of neu-
roimaging in court. The aim of these guidelines is to
mitigate the impact of cognitive biases18 and the mis-
interpretation of the neuroimaging results often presented
in forensic trials67. In particular, the correct application of
these guidelines will help to minimize both within- and
between-expert biases in conclusions23, including the
adversarial allegiance bias17,23. The guidelines are gra-
phically represented in Fig. 4.
a. Provide a descriptive diagnosis, i.e., describe the
symptoms manifested by the defendant, as
behavioural evidence is the gold standard for
determining functional impairment. The descriptive
diagnosis should be carried out, when possible, with
standardized neuropsychological tests including
indexes for controlling malingering and exaggeration
(e.g., symptom validity testing77). If the descriptive
diagnosis is negative, as in the fourth case described
in the current paper, then any accompanying sNI is
useless and should thus be excluded. If the
descriptive diagnosis is positive, investigation can
proceed to step 2.
b. Assess the causal link between the symptoms and
the crime. The causal link between altered state of
mind (i.e., symptoms) and crime78 has not been
discussed in the current paper, as it was beyond the
scope of our topic. However, it is important to
remember that in the forensic setting, the symptoms
of the defendant are important if they can be
causally linked to the actus reus. For instance,
impulse disinhibition is of great relevance in the
context of the irresistible impulse to murder, while it
is not relevant in the context of premeditation. If
there is no causal link between the descriptive
diagnosis and the crime, then sNI should not be
used, as there is no way for eventual results to be
interpreted. If there is a causal link between the
descriptive diagnosis and the crime, sNI evidence
might be useful, particularly if pre-crime clinical
evidence is missing.
c. Clarify whether the neuroimaging techniques
highlight significant results. In the case that
neuroimaging techniques produce no results, it can
be concluded that the psychopathology does not
manifest itself with structural alterations. It is
important to remember that the presence/absence of
psychopathology can be deduced only by
behavioural findings (point a); thus, a negative sNI
result does not imply the absence of
psychopathology. The identification of neural
correlates of psychiatric or personality disorders is
highly complicated and may be more evident at the
functional level than at the structural level79. Of
course, if malingering is suspected, negative
neuroimaging results could prompt a search for
additional behavioural evidence. If sNI results are
positive, the investigation can proceed to step d.
d. Use brain imaging to assess anatomo-clinical
correlation. Are the neuroimaging results in
anatomo-clinical correlation with the descriptive
diagnosis? Although neuroscientists agree that
complex behaviours are the result of a dynamic
network of interconnected brain regions80,81, it is
also true that some cognitive functions rely strongly
on a specific brain region: for instance, behavioural
control requires the correct functioning of the
prefrontal cortex82. Thus, a frontal lobe deficit
should be expected in a defendant manifesting
behavioural impulse disinhibition. If there is no
anatomo-clinical correlation, then we suggest that
the descriptive diagnosis be checked again. If the
descriptive diagnosis is correct, then the sNI results,
despite their presence, are not relevant to explain
the defendant’s behaviour, as in the case of
Gianfranco Stevanin. This may be attributable to
brain plasticity. Only if there is anatomo-clinical
correlation can the sNI data be used to support the
descriptive diagnosis.
Limitations
It is important to acknowledge some potential limita-
tions of the current paper. First, we are referring only to
structural neuroimaging findings, as we purposely omit
discussion of functional neuroimaging for the reasons
described in the introduction. Thus, our rules and
guidelines cannot be generalized to the use of functional
images in court. The use of functional imaging in this
setting is, in our opinion, still premature. Second, we
neglected to discuss the within- and between-expert bia-
ses at the observation level of the HEP model22,23, as there
are different ways in which images can be analysed, and
the literature on the topic is so wide that it would have
been impossible to summarize in the current paper. We
are aware that apparent unreliability at the level of con-
clusions may lie at the level of observation, and this would
require a different intervention23. Future studies are
needed to explore this topic.
Conclusions
In the current paper, we used real forensic cases to
highlight how neuroimaging results should be interpreted
when used as an additional instrument to reduce
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cognitive bias at the HEP conclusion level22,23 and thus
reduce controversies in the assessment of insanity.
Through a detailed analysis of two cases and an expla-
nation of errors that one may commit if results are not
correctly interpreted, we offered four general rules for the
use of neuroimaging in court. Finally, we proposed
guidelines for the correct use of neuroimaging in a for-
ensic setting. Our aim was to provide neuroscientists with
a practical guide when facing the difficulty of using neu-
roimaging as scientific evidence in support of a mental
incompetence claim.
Although the present study focuses on the use of sNI in
a forensic setting, the insights from the current analysis, as
well as the rules and guidelines defined, might be of
interest for a broad range of neuroscientists.
Indeed:
We are claiming that sNI results not coupled with
behavioural findings are meaningless. Thus, this paper
may be of interest for disentangling the controversies on
the general role of sNI results12,67,69.
The rules and guidelines proposed could be adopted
outside forensic contexts and could be applied to
individual cases, for instance, in clinical contexts2–6.
The current study provides important, practical and
exploitable guidelines that can ultimately be of immedi-
ate use to clinicians and neuroscientists who are
interested in the real-world application of neuroscientific
findings.
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